This paper gives an account of Kant's concept of self-contentment [Selbstzufriedenheit], i.e. the satisfaction involved in the performance of moral action. This concept is vulnerable to an important objection: if moral action is satisfying, it might only ever be performed for the sake of this satisfaction. I explain Kant's response to this objection and argue that it is superior to Francis Hutcheson's response to a similar objection. I conclude by showing that two other notions of moral satisfaction in Kant's moral philosophy, namely 'sweet merit' and the highest good, also avoid the objection.
Introduction
Almost since its inception, Kant's moral philosophy has been thought by many to imply that action from duty cannot be pleasing in any way. Perhaps the most well known but also the most extreme version of this kind of response is suggested by Friedrich Schiller's famous remark 1 that, on Kant's account, one can only be certain that one has acted virtuously if one does what duty commands 'with disgust' (see Schiller 1987 : 299-300, translation from Timmermann 2007 . On this reading, acting from duty involves or even requires that one dislike performing one's duty, but similar and more moderate readings at the very least suggest that there is nothing pleasing about doing one's duty. This is an important challenge to Kant's moral 2 philosophy and is one which is still very much under discussion 2 , for if Kant truly does suggest that acting morally is divorced from satisfaction entirely, then perhaps his is a moral theory unsuitable to human beings.
It might be due to readings like these that it is not often mentioned that Kant has a very specific concept for the particular kind of satisfaction associated with acting morally. Kant mentions such an idea in the Critique of Practical Reason in the context of making an objection to Francis Hutcheson's theory of the moral sense:
one must first value the importance of what we call duty, the authority of the moral law, and the immediate worth that compliance with it gives a person in his own eyes, in order to feel that satisfaction in consciousness of one's conformity with it and bitter remorse if one can reproach oneself with having transgressed it. Thus one cannot feel such satisfaction or mental unease prior to cognition of obligation and cannot make it the basis of the latter. (KpV, 5:38) 3 Kant argues here that Hutcheson is wrong to claim that the satisfaction that the moral sense enables us to feel upon perceiving moral action can ground obligation because this feeling in fact already presupposes awareness of obligation. At the same time, Kant seems to acknowledge that we nonetheless do feel such satisfaction and unease when we are aware of our conformity and transgression of duty. He says this almost explicitly a few lines later when briefly discussing the process of moral education: 'I certainly do not deny that frequent practice in conformity with this determining ground [the moral law] can finally produce subjectively a feeling of contentment with oneself [Zufriedenheit mit sich selbst]' (KpV, 5:38, translation modified) . What these passages suggest, then, and contrary to the supposition of Schiller and others, is that Kant believes that acting morally is connected with a feeling of 'contentment with oneself' or, as he
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Most importantly, Kant thinks of self-contentment as a kind of 'satisfaction
[Wohlgefallen]' (KpV, 5:117) , but one that is distinct from the satisfaction signified by happiness. In fact, Kant distinguishes between two kinds of contentment [Zufriedenheit] in order to make this point. In the Vigilantius notes we learn that ' [c] ontentment is … of two kinds, namely (1) with oneself and (2) with one's condition [Zustand] ' (27:643, translation modified).
According to Vigilantius, contentment with one's condition 'is based on the feeling of pleasure and pain' and is 'contentment … taken in a pathological sense ' (27:643) . Contentment with one's condition is equivalent to 'happiness [Glück]' (27:643) , which is clear in the Groundwork where Kant says that 'under the name of happiness' we understand 'entire well-being and contentment with one's condition' (GMS, 4:393, see also GMS, 4:399) . Distinct from contentment with one's condition is '[c] ontentment in the moral sense', which 'always has a reference to a state founded on consciousness of the law-abiding use of our freedom, and thus on the conformity of our own actions with the moral law' (27:643). On the most basic level, then, Kant thinks the satisfaction involved in self-contentment is distinct from the pathological pleasure and pain characteristic of happiness and contentment with one's condition. It is nonetheless still a kind of satisfaction, however, and as such Kant claims it is 'an analogue of happiness' (KpV, 5:117 and see 18:262 (TP, 8:283) . In this way, Kant thinks of self-contentment as related to the practice of freedom. This will be important when it comes to the nature of the satisfaction involved in self-contentment, so it deserves closer investigation.
The connection between self-contentment and freedom is explained in the Religionsphilosophie Volckman notes: 'The pleasure with one's own person is called selfcontentment [Selbstzufriedenheit] . What is characteristic of us is what freedom consists in. As a result, the pleasure with one's freedom or with the quality of one's will is self-contentment' (28:1191). In that self-contentment results from the awareness of previously willed moral action, and for Kant moral action is characteristically free action, self-contentment is something that arises from the use of our freedom. As such, and in contrast to contentment with one's condition, Kant goes on to distinguish intellectual contentment from 'aesthetic' contentment, namely the satisfaction of the inclinations. In fact, Kant claims that contentment is not the right term to use in the case of the inclinations, because they 'change, grow with the indulgence one allows them, and always leave behind a still greater void than one had thought to fill. Hence they are always burdensome to a rational being' (KpV, 5:118 Man is not of this kind; he is a dependent being' (29:600). As both rational and sensible, humans can never completely remove themselves from the burden and discontent of the inclinations, even though they may partially and temporarily do so by acting independently of them, i.e. by acting morally. Only God is completely 'independent from external causes' (28:699, see also 29:624) and thus only He is capable of achieving bliss. At the same time, because selfcontentment is at least a partial independence from the inclinations, Kant calls it 'an analogon of blessedness ' (27:656) . This implies that self-contentment is a kind of satisfaction that only beings who are both sensible and rational can attain: whereas happiness is simply the well-being resulting from the inclinations and is thus attainable by all sensible beings, self-contentment is the negative satisfaction associated with being partially removed from the burden of the inclinations that only beings who have both inclinations and the capacity for freedom can achieve. However, because we are not completely rational, we cannot achieve the complete (and permanent) independence from the inclinations attainable by God alone, namely bliss. Indeed, because God is wholly rational and is thus both completely as well as permanently independent of all inclinations, Kant observes that 'one cannot say' that 'God is happy', but only that 'he is blissfull ' (28:808) . Human beings, on the other hand, can be both happy and self-content, i.e.
content with their condition and content with their self, in virtue of the fact that they are both sensible and rational. Self-contentment is therefore a concept that occupies a middle place between happiness, on the one hand, and bliss, on the other.
The above has been intended to be an overview of how Kant understands selfcontentment [Selbstzufriedenheit] . I have illustrated that self-contentment is Kant's concept for the negative satisfaction connected to our retrospective awareness of having willed moral action.
It is self-contentment because it is dependent upon our choice to act morally and not external circumstances. It is a type of satisfaction distinct from both happiness and bliss, but is nonetheless analogous to both. In the next section I turn to an objection that this concept invites and which was put forward by Kant's contemporary Christian Garve. As we will see, Kant was aware of this objection and responded to it. I argue that certain features of Kant's conception of self-contentment, as outlined above, make it such that he avoids the objection.
Garve and the Charge of Eudaimonism
That Kant makes room in his moral theory for a kind of satisfaction associated with acting morally is certainly advantageous when it comes to dealing with responses like Schiller's.
However, to assert that moral action is connected with the above kind of satisfaction might be just as problematic. One major objection to such an idea was advanced by an important contemporary of Kant's, namely Christian Garve (1742-98 For my part I confess that I grasp this division of ideas very well with my head, but I do not find this division of desires and strivings in my heart; -that it is even inconceivable to me how any person can become aware that his longing to be worthy of happiness is purely separated from the longing for happiness itself -and has therefore performed his duty entirely disinterestedly. (Garve 1792: 112) In this passage Garve claims that although we may be able to distinguish between the 'longing to be worthy of happiness' and the 'longing for happiness itself' on a purely intellectual level, it is unclear if these two motives can in reality be found separately in the human 'heart'. Garve's main point, however, is that we have no reason for thinking that these two 'longings' are not one and the same. More specifically, Garve appears to be suggesting in this passage that, contrary to what some philosophers (i.e. Kant) may claim, the striving to be worthy of happiness is just reducible to the desire for happiness itself -the latter being something that surely can be found in the human heart. The problem that Garve poses to Kant is therefore that the virtuous motive, which is supposed to be distinct from the motive of self-interest, might in fact be reducible to self-interest after all. It is this latter objection that Kant's notion of self-contentment invites, so we should take a closer look at how Kant understood it.
In two texts written after the publication of Garve's Essays, namely the article 'On a recently prominent tone of superiority in philosophy' (1796) : if it is the case that acting from duty is satisfying, who is to say that the motive of duty is not just the desire for happiness in disguise? This is therefore an objection made from the point of view of someone who is sceptical of the possibility of acting solely from duty. From this sceptic's point of view, the fact that acting from duty is satisfying just reveals that what we think of as the (disinterested) duty motive is in fact the desire for satisfaction in disguise. The 'eudaimonist' Kant has in mind here is without a doubt Garve 13 , and as is suggested by Kant's mention of 'contentment' in the above passage, it is the notion of self-contentment that Kant believes makes him vulnerable to Garve's objection. 14 Kant believes the objection is misguided, however, and in both the 'Tone' essay and the
Metaphysics of Morals Kant responds to the eudaimonist by distinguishing between
'pathological pleasure and moral pleasure ' (MdS, 6:378) . According to Kant, '[p] leasure that must precede one's observance of the law in order for one to act in conformity with the law is pathological … but pleasure that must be preceded by the law in order to be felt is in the moral order' (MdS, 6:378) . On the one hand, therefore, there are pathological pleasures, the expectation of which can act as a motive to action. 15 On the other hand, there is a certain kind of pleasure that only results from acting on the basis of the moral law, i.e. from duty. With this distinction in hand, Kant responds to the eudaimonist's objection by claiming that the latter's reasoning is fallacious and his objection therefore meaningless. In the 'Tone' essay, for example, Kant says the following:
since I must assume him [the righteous person] beforehand to be righteous and obedient to the law, i.e., to be one in whom the law precedes the pleasure, in order for him subsequently to feel a pleasure of the soul in the consciousness of his well-conducted course of life, it is an empty circle in the reasoning to make the pleasure, which is a consequence, into the cause of that course of life. (T, 8:395) Based on his distinction between pathological and moral pleasure, then, Kant argues it is in fact impossible for the expectation of moral pleasure to somehow be the true motive of our strivings to be worthy of happiness. This is because it is only when we are already motivated by the moral law alone and not the expectation of future pleasure that it is possible for us to experience moral pleasure in the first place. To perform virtuous actions only for the sake of the resulting pleasure is precisely not to have the moral motive -it is to be motivated by the desire for pleasure.
Indeed, given the nature of moral pleasure, it is simply a logical mistake 16 to think one can experience moral pleasure if one's reason for acting is the expectation of this pleasure.
In sum, then, Kant's response to the eudaimonist is to show that self-contentment does not threaten the reduction of the duty motive to self-interest insofar as self-contentment is a 'moral pleasure'. Indeed, Kant suggests explicitly that self-contentment is an instance of moral pleasure when he describes the latter as 'a pleasure of the soul in the consciousness of [one's] well-conducted course of life' (T, 8:395). 17 Self-contentment requires that one first act from duty alone, and not from self-interest, so that one may retrospectively be aware of having such a motive.
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Perhaps it goes without saying that Kant is not the first to claim that there is a particular kind of satisfaction associated with acting morally, nor is he alone in answering the kind of benevolence is not only possible in the responsive situations described above, the fact that it can be raised from self-interest at all seems to grant the psychological egoist a bit too much. A moderate egoist, for example, may be perfectly happy to grant that benevolence is possible when brought about by self-interest in the way Hutcheson allows, for they might argue that this in fact does nothing to disprove their core claim that humans are, in essence, entirely self-interested.
Hutcheson's writings suggest that he would not be happy to grant the egoist this much. As a result, Hutcheson's response to the objection is not a particularly strong one.
Kant's Response to the Sceptical Challenge
Kant's solution to the charge of eudaimonism is more satisfying than Hutcheson's, and this is due, above all, to an important feature of self-contentment that has not yet been discussed.
At the beginning of this paper I mentioned that Kant discusses self-contentment in the second
Critique in connection with an objection he makes to Hutcheson's moral sense theory, namely that the satisfaction of the moral sense cannot ground moral judgement, for the ability to experience such satisfaction in fact presupposes awareness or knowledge of moral obligation (see KpV, 5:38) . Shortly after making this objection, Kant discusses self-contentment in relation to moral education and claims:
Someone must be at least half way toward being an honest man to even frame for himself entirely rules out the possibility of acting morally for the sake of self-interest. As such, Kant avoids the sceptical challenge posed by the psychological egoist, in his instance Garve, in a much more satisfactory fashion: the striving to be worthy of happiness is not the same as the striving for happiness itself, and it is strictly impossible for the moral motive to be reduced to self-interest. Kant therefore does not grant even the moderate egoist as much as Hutcheson does, and for this reason Kant's notion of self-contentment amounts to a more satisfying solution to the charge of eudaimonism than that offered by Hutcheson.
Varieties of Moral Satisfaction
In the above sections my focus has been on Kant's understanding of self-contentment and how it both invites and avoids the sceptical challenge posed by Garve. Even if Kant successfully avoids this challenge, however, if we return to Schiller's response then Kant may not be in any better a position than he was when we started. One might argue, for example, that selfcontentment, as a merely 'negative' satisfaction, is no real satisfaction at all, and thus the objection remains that Kant's moral theory is unfit for human beings given its complete separation from any kind of real satisfaction. Self-contentment is not the only concept Kant has for how moral action can be satisfying, however. In this last section I wish to briefly discuss two additional concepts that capture the way in which virtue is satisfying, for Kant, as well as indicate how they each avoid the charge of eudaimonism.
First, in the Metaphysics of Morals Kant acknowledges that there is something beyond self-contentment, i.e. something that is a reward for virtue but that is also more positive. As Kant says there:
there is a subjective principle of ethical reward, that is, a receptivity to being rewarded in accordance with laws of virtue: the reward, namely, of a moral pleasure that goes beyond mere contentment with oneself (which can be merely negative) and which is celebrated in the saying that, through consciousness of this pleasure, virtue is its own reward. [Mitfreude]' here is decisive: our ability to sympathize with others and feel happy when they are (which happens when we make the happiness of others our end), is a 'sweet' reward that we are merited in experiencing for helping others. At the same time, Kant also discusses 'bitter merit' in this context, which he claims 'comes from promoting the true well-being of others even when they fail to recognize it as such (when they are unappreciative and ungrateful) … All that it produces is contentment with oneself, although in this case the merit would be greater still' (MdS, 6:391). Kant thus contrasts sweet merit with self-contentment, the latter being the (sometimes bitter) merit we experience from promoting the well-being of others even when they do not appreciate our efforts. This is of a higher order than 'sweet merit', even though it is a merely negative satisfaction. The most important difference between sweet merit and selfcontentment, however, is that the negative satisfaction of self-contentment is the only kind of merit we can ever count on since, as I discussed above, it is the only kind of satisfaction that is in our control. This is the case because happiness, as Kant says in the Groundwork, 'is so indeterminate a concept that, even though every human being wishes to achieve it, yet he can never say determinately and in agreement with himself what he actually wishes and wants' (GMS, 4:418). As such, one could say that the happiness of others is even more indeterminate, thus it is even more difficult for us to reliably promote. And this is what makes it such that sweet merit does not even invite an objection like Garve's: we would not be motivated to pursue virtue in order to attain sweet merit, for despite our efforts we cannot reliably expect to promote the happiness of others and feel happiness through sympathy as a result, for we cannot possibly determine what the happiness of others consists in.
Kant's most well-known and perhaps most important conception of a satisfaction connected to acting morally is, of course, his notion of the highest good. As Kant says in the second Critique, the idea of the highest good connects 'morality of disposition … as cause with happiness as effect in the sensible world' (KpV, 5:115) . The many details and problems associated with Kant's notion of the highest good aside, what is relevant for the purposes of this paper is that the idea of the highest good invites the same kind of sceptical challenge discussed above. Indeed, Arthur Schopenhauer raised this kind of objection in his Critique of the Kantian
Philosophy:
Happiness in the highest good is certainly not supposed to be the real motive for virtue: it stands there nonetheless, like a secret article whose presence turns the rest of the contract into a mere sham. It is not actually the reward of virtue, but rather a free gift that virtue furtively seeks out after performing its work. (Schopenhauer 2010: 555) Kant seems to have been aware that the highest good invites the charge of eudaimonism as well, for he takes Garve's objection to be directed towards both it and self-contentment. This is evident in Kant's 'Theory and Practice' essay, where Kant names Garve explicitly as his addressee (see TP, 8:278) and states in a footnote that the incentive which is present in the idea of the highest good possible in the world by his cooperation is not his own happiness thereby intended but only this idea as end in itself, and hence compliance with it as duty. For it contains no prospect of happiness absolutely, but only of a proportion between it and the worthiness of a subject, whatever that may be.
But a determination of will which limits itself and its aim of belonging to such a whole to this condition is not selfish. (TP, 8:279n) In this passage Kant asserts explicitly that the fact that the highest good includes happiness does not mean that we pursue virtue, i.e. becoming worthy of happiness, from selfish motives. His explanation of why this is the case is interesting: happiness is not something I can trust to result necessarily or 'absolutely' from acting virtuously. As he explains most clearly in the Critique of Pure Reason, happiness is merely what I can hope to result 'if I behave so as not to be unworthy of happiness' (A 809/B 837). Given the uncertainty of happiness resulting from making oneself worthy of happiness, happiness is not much of an incentive to acting virtuously. 23 Indeed, sweet merit and the highest good have this feature in common: whether they are bestowed upon us is uncertain, unreliable, and outside of our control. The only kind of moral satisfaction we can rely on is self-contentment, for it is the only kind of moral satisfaction that is fully in our control. The only reliable way of achieving self-contentment, however, it to set aside self-interest so that we might reflect on our past actions and feel justified that we have done our duty for duty's sake.
Conclusion
The goal of this paper has been, first and foremost, to give an account of a neglected conception of moral satisfaction in Kant's moral philosophy, namely self-contentment. My secondary aim has been to make a small contribution to the debate surrounding the alleged (see 2009: 176) . I argue below that it is correct to say that self-contentment is a kind of moral pleasure, but self-contentment is equivalent to neither the positive side of respect, nor to moral feeling, primarily because these latter two concepts refer to feelings that takes place prior to the willing and therefore also the execution of action. For example, in his most extensive discussion of both respect and moral feeling in the second Critique (the third chapter of the Analytic), Kant claims that these concepts refer to feelings that are brought about in the mind when the a priori moral law becomes an incentive and determines the will on its own (see KpV, 5:71ff.) . The determination of the will is what must take place before any actual willing of an action, thus if respect and moral feeling are brought about at this stage, then they precede willing. As indicated in the passages just quoted, however, self-contentment arises only once willing is completed and we retrospectively reflect on the fact that we were motivated by the moral law alone. Although self-contentment is surely a feeling associated with the willing of moral action, it occurs at a different stage of this process, i.e. not prior to or even during the process of willing but subsequent to it. Additionally, both respect and moral feeling take place each time we are conscious of the moral law (see e.g. KpV, 5:80). As I illustrate below, self-contentment can only be experienced once one makes significant progress towards becoming a virtuous person, and thus is not experienced each time the moral law determines the will. GMS, 4:407, Rel, 6:51, MdS, 6:392) . The issue is the following: if self-contentment arises from the awareness of having willed action not only in conformity with duty but from duty, then there is a concern that we can never experience self-contentment because we can never know with certainty that we have done our duty from duty. In order to give an account of how self-contentment is possible, then, we need a way to explain how we can be aware of having done our duty. While a highly interesting topic that deserves more discussion in the literature, providing a full account of how this is possible, for Kant, would take me too far afield from the main purposes of my paper. However, I would like to take this opportunity to make a preliminary attempt at resolving the issue.
I believe the clue to resolving this issue is evident from the fact that Kant thinks we can overestimate our morality, as is apparent in his definition of arrogance (arrogantia). In the Collins lectures notes, for example, arrogance is what 'makes an unwarranted pretension to merit. It lays claim to more moral perfections than are due to it ' (27:357) , and in the Vigilantius notes arrogance is said to lead us to 'engender a self-contentment in ourselves, and respect ourselves self-lovingly, without assessment of our true moral worth ' (27:622) . Insofar as Kant believes that we can be arrogant and we can be mistaken in our assessment of the extent to which we have acted morally, he acknowledges that such an assessment is fallible and thus never certain. In contrast to the unjustified assessment of our worth involved in arrogance, Kant also mentions 'a justified satisfaction with oneself [ein gegrundetes
Wohlgefallen gegen sich selbst]' (27:622, emphasis added). This presumably involves a more accurate assessment of our motives, though still not a certain knowledge thereof. Accordingly, when Kant says that self-contentment arises from our awareness of having acted from duty, I do not take him to mean that we must know our motives in order for it to arise, but rather that it arises merely from our believing ourselves to have acted from duty alone. Given this opens up the possibility of overestimating (or indeed underestimating) the extent to which we have done so, it is essential that we do our best to assess the morality of our previously completed actions accurately and have good reason to think we have acted not only in conformity to the law, but from the law as well (cf. MdS, 6:441). Although we may never be certain, this is all we can hope for given the obscurity of our true motives. In any event, what is important for my discussion is that motivational obscurity does not prevent one from experiencing self-contentment, it just means experiencing this can be, as Kant says, justified or unjustified.
9 Indeed, Kant even suggests that too much meddling on our part to secure our own happiness can even bring us further away from securing our own happiness (see GMS, 4:395-6).
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self-contentment is a moral pleasure in that it can only be felt after one is already 'righteous and obedient to the law' (T, 8:395) . At the same time, we have to be careful here, for as I illustrated above, selfcontentment is not a pleasure if by pleasure we mean the pathological pleasure of happiness. Indeed, Kant himself seems sceptical of calling it a pleasure as well when after referring to it as such in the 'Tone' essay he immediately clarifies, in brackets, that what he means is '(contentment) ' (see T, 8:395n) . 18 For a similar but very brief reconstruction of Kant's response to this kind of challenge, see Wood (1970: 38-50 and to some it means a long habituation (in observance of the law), in virtue of which a human being, through gradual reformation of conduct and consolidation of his maxims, passes from a propensity to vice
